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I. INTRODUCTION 
The call came at my home one evening in late July 1997: When 
would I be there? Would I like to work on the "check cashing" 
cases? 
The caller was John Rosenberg, the much-honored director of 
the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund (Appalred), a legal 
services organization serving eastern Kentucky.l Some months be-
fore, we had made arrangements for me to spend a sabbatical year 
as a volunteer staff attorney and "professor in residence" at Appal-
red's office in Prestonsburg, Kentucky. I told him that I would be 
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. My thanks to the staff 
of the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund for permitting me to work with 
them for a year and to the administration of William Mitchell for affording me the 
opportunity to do so. 
1. To learn more about Mr. Rosenberg and the organization to which he has 
dedicated nearly thirty years, see Milner S. Ball, The Work and the Law 16-24 (1993). 
973 
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arriving within a week and that yes, I would be willing to work on 
"check cashing" cases. To pique my interest, John told me that 
evening how the transactions worked, but, I must confess, I under-
stood little of what he said. 
Over the course of the year that followed, I did indeed have 
the privilege of working on "check cashing" cases. I came to un-
derstand how the transactions work and how they affect the lives of 
consumers. Along with other Appalred attorneys, I worked on de-
veloping legal theories to challenge the practices of "check cash-
ers," and I watched and participated in the lawmaking process, in 
both the courts and the legislature. Since my return to teaching in 
mid-1998, I have watched the story continue. 
What follows is part narrative and part essay. Although I ini-
tially adopted the term "check cashing" to describe such transac-
tions, because it was common parlance, I have used the term 
"check-based loans" here, because it is more accurate. In Parts I 
and II, I have described the typical check-based loan transaction 
and its effects on low-income consumers. In Part III, I have re-
counted how the law of check-based loans has developed in Ken-
tucky, during my time there
2 
and since. In Part IV, I have set forth 
some observations about language and legal process, suggested by 
the preceding narrative. 
II. CHECK-BASED LOAN TRANSACTIONS 
In December 1997,JudgeJoseph M. Hood of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky described the 
two stages of check-baSed loans as follows: 
The following is how the "check cashing" transactions 
worked. The [borrowers] would give [the lender] a 
document in the form of a check in exchange for cash. 
[The lender] agreed to hold the "check" for two weeks be-
fore presenting it for payment or before requiring the 
[borrowers] to "pick up" the check by paying the face 
amount. [The lender's] charge for cashing and holding 
the check for two weeks was 20% of the sums advanced. 
2. I have chosen not to recount in much detail what occurred behind the 
scenes, in part because of concerns for confidentiality and in part because I clearly 
saw the lawyering on only one side of the case. Suffice it to say that there were 
moments of high intellectual discourse, mind-numbing factual investigation, mild 
panic, wry humor, serious frustration, complete befuddlement, exultation, and 
resignation. 
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The [borrowers] incurred the 20% charge for the use of 
[the lender's] money and the ability to delay the [pre-
sentment] of the check. 
In the "deferral" transactions, upon the expiration of two 
weeks, [the lender] would allow the [borrowers] to defer 
presentment of their check in exchange for an additional 
10% of the sum originally advanced for each week of de-
ferral. The "deferral" fees were incurred by the [borrow-
ers] in order to have more time to payoff their original 
"check." The [borrowers] allege that [the lender] knew 
or reasonably should have known that at the time of the 
"check cashing" and "deferral" transactions that they did 
not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the checks 
given to [the lender]. If the [borrowers] had enough 
money in the bank to cover the amount they were asking 
for plus 20%, they would not have needed to borrow any 
3 money from [the lender]. 
975 
For example, on July 1st, the borrower would write a check to 
the lender for $100 and date itJuly 15th; the borrower would re-
ceive $80 in cash. The borrower thereafter would have three op-
tions. 
First, the borrower could do nothing, permitting the lender to 
present the check to the borrower's bank on or after July 15th. In 
the unlikely event that the borrower's account then had sufficient 
funds to cover the check, the check would clear, and the transac-
tion would conclude. More likely, there would not be sufficient 
funds, and the check would· return to the lender as NSF (not suffi-
cient funds), i.e. a bad check. At that point, the lender would re-
sort to some mechanism for prompting the borrower to make good 
on an NSF check, presumably criminal prosecution or the threat of 
criminal prosecution.
4 
Second, the borrower could return to the lender on July 15th 
with $lOO cash and buy back the check, thereby concluding the 
transaction. The borrower would have to have sufficient cash for 
this option. 
Third, the borrower could return to the lender on July 15th 
and buy additional time by paying the lender, say, $20 to continue 
deferring presentment of the check to the bank for another two 
weeks. OnJuly 29th, if the borrower could not buy back the check, 
3. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997). 
4. Id. at 958. 
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he or she could again extend the transaction for another fee, and 
so on. By late August, the borrower would have re-paid the $80 
originally advanced-and still have to pay $100 to conclude the 
transaction. 
Judge Hood contrasted check-based loans with standard check-
cashing transactions: 
[I] f a person walked into a check cashing establishment 
with a government check for $1,000 and the business gave 
him $900 for the check ... the $100 payment would be a 
service fee, not discounted interest. The above $100 
charge is considered a service fee because the business is 
not receiving the $100 for the use of its money, but rather 
the service of processing and providing instant cash to 
5 
unbanked people. 
Note the essential differences between check-based loans and 
standard check cashing: Check cashing typically involves a check 
written by an employer or government welfare fund to the cus-
tomer;6 check-based loans involve a check written by the borrower 
to the lender. Check cashers present the checks they receive for 
payment; in the typical check-based loan, the lender intends not to 
present the check to the borrower's bank. Check cashing does not 
entail an ongoing obligation on the part of the customer; check-
based loans do. Finally, the fees paid differ significantly: a single 
fee of, say, ten percent for standard check-cashing transactions ver-
sus an on-going fee at an annual rate of over 500%. 
III. THE IMPACT OF CHECK-BASED LOANS ON BORROWERS 
According to a March 1998 advertisement run by the Kentucky 
Deferred Deposit Association, a trade group of check-based lend-
ers, 250,000 Kentucky consumers engaged in check-based loans:7 
The specifics of their life circumstances no doubt varied somewhat, 
but most probably shared certain traits: low or moderate income, 
few financial resources, little sophistication in financial matters, 
5. [d. at 956. Judge Hood's ten percent fee is much higher than standard; 
the Consumer Federation of America found in its 1997 survey that fees for cashing 
payroll and Social Security checks averaged 2.34% and 2.21 % respectively. Jean 
Ann Fox et aI., The High Cost of "Banking" at the Corner Check Casher: Check Cashing 
Outlet Fees and Payday Loans 4 (Consumer Federation of America 1997). The CFA 
report provides an overview of standard check-cashing practices and state laws. 
6. Some check cashers also cash personal checks, typically for a hefty fee, 
averaging 9.36%. Fox, supra note 5, at 4. 
7. LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 16, 1998, at AS. 
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and some pressing need for cash. 
For example, Rebecca Reed,s a hotel housekeeper and high 
school dropout, dealt with thirteen lenders, eventually seeking 
bankruptcy protection. She sought money to cover court costs and 
insurance fees after a car accident, for which she was uninsured be-
cause she had missed an insurance premium payment. Michael 
Hines,9 a student at the University of Kentucky and Wal-Mart em-
ployee, needed cash to payoff credit cards and cover his truck 
payment. He borrowed $350 and eventually paid about $3,000 in 
fees. Rodney Jackson, 10 a retired police officer, borrowed $200 to 
get his car repaired, intending to repay the loan with the proceeds 
of a student loan and his Social Security payment. But he paid 
$500 in fees without discharging his obligation to repay the $200. 
My experience was with individuals with such limited incomes 
that they qualified for legal services. They needed cash for every-
day needs: car repairs, medicine, and children's clothes. They in-
tended to buy back their checks with their next welfare or disability 
checks or paychecks. Until they were well into the cycle, most of 
my clients little understood the prices they were paying. Rarely had 
they read II an explanation of the loan or been told how it worked-
except that they understood full well that they would be prosecuted 
by the local county attorney for passing a bad check if they failed to 
pay the fees or buy back their checks. 
By May of 1998, a lawyer representing the bankruptcy trustee 
for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky reported that over ninety reople had filed Chapter 13 pe-
titions involving check-based loans. I He stated, "They weren't buy-
ing food. They weren't payinR utilities. They spent all of their Fri-
day paying off check cashers." 
8. Amy Baldwin, Check Cashers Unchecked, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 
19,1997, atAl, AlO. 
9. Amy Baldwin, Student Borrows Hundreds and Pays Back Thousands, LEXINe. 
TON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 19, 1997, atAI0. 
10. Stephen Rothman, Officials Call Payday Financing 'Loan Sharking: BANK 
RATE MONITOR ONLINE, (Feb. 18, 1998) available at http://www.bankrate.com.-
html. 
11. Many were low-literate. 
12. Amy Baldwin, New Round of Lawsuits Hits Check-Cashing Companies, LEX· 
INGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 9,1998, at BI-B2. 
13. [d. at B2. 
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IV. KENTUCKY'S REGULATION OF CHECK-BASED LOANS 
A. The Legal Landscape 
In the late 1990's, Kentucky regulated small consumer loans 
from several anRles. Consumer lenders were required to be li-
censed as such. Ther were prohibited from charging interest 
above 36% per annum. I Lenders were required to provide certain 
disclosures of loan terms, including the annual percentage rate.
16 
They were forbidden from engaging in unfair, deceptive, false, mis-
leading, or unconscionable practices.
17 
Then, as now, federal law buttressed state regulation. The 
federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act prohibits collecting an unlawful debt, which is defined 
as lending money at a rate twice that permitted by state or federal 
law. IS The federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires disclosure 
of annual percentage rates, finance charges, and amount fi-
nanced.19 
These statutes apply to loans and interest.
2o 
The check-based 
loan industry maintained that the transactions were not, from a le-
gal standpoint, loans, and the fees charged were not interest.21 
Check-based lenders operated as check cashers under Kentucky's 
check cashing statute.
22 
The check cashing statute then read as fol-
lows: "Any fee charged by a licensee for cashing a check shall be 
disclosed in writing to the bearer of the check prior to cashing the 
check, and the fee shall be deemed a service fee and not interest. ,,23 
The industry's position had a certain semantic appeal to it. In 
a check-based loan, the customer does receive cash, and the busi-
ness does obtain a check. Especially if the ongoing nature of the 
obligation to pay a fee is overlooked, the business does seem to be 
charging a fee for a service. 
14. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 288.420 (Michie 1988). 
15. Id. § 288.530. See also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 360.010 (Michie 1996) (gen-
eral usury statute). 
16. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 360.220 (Michie 1996)(repealed 2000). 
17. Id. § 367.110 (Michie 1996). 
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(6), 1962 (1994). 
19. 15 U.S.c. § 1640 et. seq. (1994). 
20. The tenns vary from statute to statute. For example, TlLA uses "credit" 
and "finance charge." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(e), 1605(a) (1994). 
21. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (stating Defen-
dant's argument). 
22. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 368.010-990 (Michie 1996)(amended 1998). 
23. Id. § 368.100(2). 
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However, upon a close reading of the check cashing statute, 
one can see that check-based loans do not fit the statutory para-
digm. For example, section 368.100(2), quoted above, refers to the 
customer as the "bearer of the check." The bearer of a check is 
"the person in possession of an instrument. .. payable to bearer.,,24 
In a check-based loan, the customer, in writing a check to the 
lender, is the maker of the check, not the bearer. As another ex-
ample, the check cashing statute provided that "[n]o licensee shall 
cash a check payable to a payee other than a natural person unless 
the licensee has previously obtained appropriate documentation 
from the board of directors or similar governing body of the payee 
clearly indicating the authority of the natural person or persons 
cashing the check ... on behalf of the payee.,,25 This is nonsensical 
in the context of check-based loans, where the payee is indeed a 
business, i.e. the lender. That is, the check is payable to the lender 
("other than a natural person"), so the lender ("licensee") must 
obtain documentation from its own board of directors ("the boar-
d ... of the payee") indicating the authority of the customer ("the 
natural person") cashing the check on behalf of the lender ("the 
payee"). 
Furthermore, according to one of its sponsors, the purpose of 
the check cashing statute, as enacted in 1992, was to prevent check 
cashing businesses from charging excessive fees to cash payroll 
checks for military rsersonnel without bank accounts and to prevent 
money laundering. 6 
In contrast to the statutory language and its legislative history 
was the position of the Kentucky Department of Financial Institu-
tions ("DFI"). The DFI licensed check-based lenders under the 
check cashing statute, a practice its acting peneral counsel en-
dorsed in an affidavit filed in federal court.
2 However, the DFI 




Without the shield of the check cashing statute, the transac-
24. Id. § 355.1-201 (5) (Michie 1996) (amended 2000). 
25. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(4) (1996 & Supp. 1998). 
26. Statement of Sen. Smith, Third Reading and Vote on H.B. 747 before the 
Full Senate, Videotape 50-VVD2 (Mar. 27, 1992), Kentucky Department for Librar-
ies and Archives, Archives Video Vault. 
27. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 n.5 (E.D. Ky. 1970). Curiously, 
the form to be filled out by a licensee included a question regarding the proce-
dure for checks made payable to non-natural persons. 
28. White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W. 2d 496, 498 (Ky. 1999). 
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tions clearly would amount to loans and the fees to interest. A 
standard definition of "loan" is "[d]elivery by one party to and re-
ceipt by another of a sum of money upon agreement, express or 
implied, to repay it with or without interest.,,29. "Interest" is defined 
as "compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use 
cb d' f ,,30 or J.or earance or etentIon 0 money. 
Furthennore, Kentucky law has long taken a substance-over-
form approach to the matter of identifying a transaction as a loan, 
as in Hurt v. Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co.: 
The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers, 
to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise 
whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary re-
lief from financial embarrassment, as would naturally be 
expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to 
evade the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the 
courts have been compelled to look beyond the fonn of a 
transaction to its substance, and they have laid it down as 
an inflexible rule that the mere form is immateria~ but that it 
is the substance which must be considered. No case is to be 
judged by what the parties appear to be or represent 
themselves to be doing, but by the transaction as disclosed 
by the whole evidence; and, if from that it is in substance a 
receiving or contracting for the receiving of usurious in-
terest for a loan or forbearance of rrioney the parties are 
subject to the statutory consequences, no matter what de-
vice they may have employed to conceal the true character 
of their dealings.3) 
In addition, Kentucky case law has long distinguished fees for 
services from interest by focusing on their respective functions. A 
lender may, by good-faith agreement, charge fees for services, in 
addition to a legal rate of interest, so long as the fees are for ser-
vices rendered, e.g., for a tide examination or property appraisal, 
32 
and "not a cloak to conceal usury" 
In analyzing a check-based loan transaction, one might distin-
guish the initial fee (what Judge Hood called the "check cashing" 
transaction) from the fee paid later to continue the transaction 
29. BLACK'S LAWDICfIONARY 844 (5th ed. 1979). 
30. Id. at 729. 
31. 286 S.w. 1055, 1056-57 (1926) (emphasis added). 
32. Harding v. Ky. Title Trust Co., 108 S.W.2d 539, 548-49 (Ky. 1937), cert. de-
nied, 303 U.S. 635 (1938). 
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(what Judge Hood called the "deferral" transaction) .33 The initial 
fee might be thought of as payment for the convenience of obtain-
ing cash now, without the necessity of visiting a bank or bank cash 
machine; but the initial fee is rather large for such a convenience, 
and the real point of the initial transaction, in the era of ubiquitous 
cash machines, clearly is to buy the consumer time. The later fees 
can only be understood as buying time, that is, compensation paid 
to the lender by the borrower for detaining the lender's money for 
a specified period. 
B. The Federal Court Litigation 
In December of 1997, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky ruled on the legal status of check-
based loans under Kentucky and federallaw.
34 
The case, Hamilton 
v. York d/b/a HLT Check Exchange, LLP, was brought by two borrow-
ers who sought damages under various state and federal claims.
35 
The Hamiltons were represented by Appalred and a small firm 
from eastern Kentucky known for its success in trial work; HLT was 
represented by a large Lexington firm, Stites & Harbison. Hamilton 
was filed in KentuckY's Pike Circuit Court in August of 1997 and 
36 . 
removed by the Defendant to federal court on the ground that 
the Complaint stated federal claims. After an extension of time to 
file an answer passed, the Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6) .37 
Judge Joseph Hood's reason for denying the Defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss is most clearly reflected in this passage: 
In looking at the substance of the transactions between 
the Hamiltons and HLT, as opposed to the form, the 
Court finds that the transactions were nothing more than 
interest bearing loans. HLT was not cashing the Hamil-
tons' checks, but rather, it was giving them short-term 
loans that could be deferred for an additional 10% per 
33. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997). 
34. Id. 
35. Verified Complaint, Hamilton v. York, C.A. No. 97-CI-1300 (Pike Cir. Ct. 
Ky. Aug. 19, 1997). 
36. Notice of Removal to United States District Court, Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, Pikeville Division, Hamilton v. York, No. 97-CI-361 (Pike Cir. Ct. Ky. Sept. 
19,1997). 
37. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), Hamilton v. York, No. 97-CI-361 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 
15, 1997). 
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week.
38 
In his ruling, judge Hood relied on the Hurt case and diction-
ary definitions quoted above. 39 He explained that the check cash-
ing statute applied to cashing of government checks and not short-
term loans, noting that otherwise, lenders "could make long-term 
loans as long as [they were] under the guise of cashing a check.,,40 
He found no substantive authority for the Defendant's argument 
that the legislature intended to encompass short-term loans within 
the check cashing statute.
41 
Accordingly, judge Hood permitted the Plaintiffs' claims based 
on Kentucky's usury and consumer loan statutes and federal TILA 
42 and RICO to proceed. He further found that the Defendant had 
engaged in common law and statutory fraud by disguising the busi-
ness as a check cashing operation, failing to disclose the terms of 
the loans, and threatening criminal prosecution for writing bad 
checks when the Defendant had to have known such a prosecution 
would not succeed based on a usurious loan.
43 
While the scope of judge Hood's ruling is not stated in so 
many words, the opinion is written broadly enough to encompass 
both the initial and later fees. For example, he described the 
transactions not as cashing of checks, but as "short-term loans that 
could be deferred for an additional 10% per week.,,44 
The Hamilton case was not the first case to raise these issues in 
the Kentucky federal courts, although judge Hood ruled first. In 
Miller v. HLT Check Exchange,45 the Plaintiff filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion in bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and 
the Defendants (a company and its owner) filed a claim for a $600 
NSF check written by the Plaintiff pursuant to a check-based loan 
38. Hamilton, 987 F. Supp. at 956. 
39. [d. Supra notes 29 and 31 and accompanying text. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. (specifically dismissing the affidavit of the acting general counsel of 
the Department of Financial Institutions). 
42. As to TILA,Judge Hood ruled that the transactions came within statutory 
definitions of "credit" and "finance charge." [d. at 956-58. 
43. [d. at 958. 
44. [d. at 956 (emphasis added). There is some ambiguity, however. In 
places, Judge Hood referred to the transactions he deemed within the scope of 
state and federal laws as "deferred-repayment transactions." [d. at 957-58. This 
probably is a broad term encompassing both transactions, which he earlier labeled 
"check cashing" and "deferral" transactions. In a footnote, he noted that consum-
ers are entitled to relief "[g]iven the potentially lengthy duration" of the transac-
tions. [d. at 957 n.8. 
45. 215 B.R. 970 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997). 
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transaction.
46 
The Plaintiff challenged the Defendants' practices in 
an adversary proceeding, alleging violations of TILA and the Ken-
tucky disclosure, usury, and consumer fraud statutes.47 
Ruling on the Defendants' m~tion to dismiss,48 one week after 
Judge Hood ruled, Judge William Howard confined his analysis to 
what he called "renewal" charges, finding that the initial fee 
charged when the cash was received was not as "troubling" and 
"contemplated by" section 368.100.
49 
Refusing to dismiss the TILA 
claim, he found that the transaction fell within TILA's scope: 
[F]or the defendants to argue that they are not extending 
credit is disingenuous. They are disbursing funds to peo-
ple like the plaintiff on the promise of repayment of the 
sum plus the "service charge," at a later time. If this is not 
an extension of credit~ this Court finds it hard to imagine 
any transaction that is. 0 
For the same reasons, Judge Howard refused to dismiss the 
claims under Kentucky's disclosure and usury statutes. 51 As to the 
consumer fraud claim, Judge Howard focused on whether the De-
fendants' conduct in threatening a bad-check prosecution was un-
conscionable. Finding that such a charge could succeed or fail de-
pending on the check-writer's intent, Judge Howard ruled that the 
Defendants had not demonstrated that the Plaintiffs had failed to 
state a claim of unconscionable conduct.52 
In a footnote in his Hamilton opinion, Judge Hood observed: 
"Surely, the Kentucky legislature did not intend for businesses to be 
able to 'get around' the usury statute and charge exorbitant inter-
est rates by simply obtaining a 'check cashing' license. However, if 
this is what the legislature wanted, it will have to clarifY its in ten-
, 53 
tions." , 
C. The Legislative Response 
Whether clarifYing its intentions or not, by April of 1998, the 
Kentucky General Assembly had responded. Chapter 601 states 
46. Id. at 972. 
47. Id. at 971-72. 
48. Id. at 972. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 974. 
51. Id. at 974-75. 
52. Id. at 975 (citing Rice v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1991». 
53. Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1997). 
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that the General Assembly was responding to an emergency: "the 
working people of the Commonwealth [are] being charged outra-
geous fees when they enter into deferred deposit transactions 
which has led many to economic ruin.,,54 Accordingly, chapter 601 
was effective upon the governor's signature in mid_Apri1.
55 
One of the House bill's sponsors stated that the new law's pur-
pose is to regulate check-based loan businesses for the first time.
56 
Its strategy is to amend the check cashing statute. It added a new 
concept-deferred deposit transaction-and a new definition: "for 
consideration, accepting a check and holding the check for a pe-
riod of time prior to deposit or presentment in accordance to an 
agreement with or any representation made to the maker of the 
check, whether express or implied.,,57 The new law requires a de-
ferred deposit service business to be licensed.
58 
It adds various re-
strictions on deferred deposit transactions, including: 
* a ceiling on service fees ($15 per $100 of the face 
amount of the deferred deposit check, for a fourteen-day 
. d) 59 peno ; 
* a prohibition against altering the date on a check; 
* a prohibition against unfair or deceptive acts; 
* a restriction on the number and amount of transactions 
between a customer and a deferred deposit service busi-
ness pending at any time (only one with a face value of 
over $500); 
* a similar restriction on entering into a deferred deposit 
transaction with a customer who has outstanding deferred 
deposit transactions with another business; 
* a limitation on the time period for holding a deferred 
deposit transaction (no more than sixty days); 
54. 1998 Ky. Acts Ch. 601 § 15. 
55. Id. Kentucky's law was not the first on the subject to explicitly address 
check-based loans. See generally MINN. STAT. Ch. 427, S.F. No. 2870 (2000); Mo. 
REv. STAT. § 408.500 (amended by L. 1998 H.B. 1189); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-
101 et seq. (1997 Supp.); WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 31.45.073 (1998 Supp.). 
56. Statement of Rep. Jack Coleman, Reading and Vote on H.B. 226 before 
the Full House, Feb. 11, 1998, Legislative Research Commission Public Informa-
tion Office Videotape (cited in White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 499 
(Ky. 1999). 
57. Ch. 601 § 1 (amending KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.010 (Michie 1992». 
58. Id. § 2 (amending KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.020 (Michie 1992». 
59. Id. § 9 (amending KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.100, the new language follow-
ing the original language that renders the fee for cashing a check a fee for service 
rather than interest). 
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* a requirement of a written agreement; 
* a ban oil renewing, rolling over, or consolidating de-
ferred deposit transactions for a fee; 
* several provisions prohibiting the prosecution or threat-
ened prosecution of a customer for writing a bad check, as 
well as requiring a sign stating the prohibition;60 
* a provision permitting the collection of a fee for NSF 
checks, so long as the fee is disclosed to the customer; 
* a provision stating. that any personal check accepted 
from a customer must be payable to the licensee; and 
* a requirement that the deferred deposit service business 
provide TILA disclosures and post a schedule of its fees.
61 
985 
Chapter 601 was introduced January 9, 1998 and passed within 
three months.
62 
The industry, via the Kentucky Deferred Deposit 
Association, was actively involved; its chief lobbyist was former lieu-
tenant governor Steve Beshear, and it spent over $100,000 on lob-
bying from September 1997 through April 1998.63 The interests of 
consumers were presented by the state's attorney general, Ken-
tuckians for the Commonwealth, the Consumer Federation of 
America, and Appalred.
64 
The bill underwent numerous amend-
ments and triggered a conference committee, the main points of 
contention at the end being the permissible fee and the number of 
roll-overs permitted, if any. 
The new statute may have fixed the rules for check-based loans 
entered into in April 1998 and thereafter, but a major question 
nonetheless remained. 
60. Id. 
61. !d. § 14 (adding a new section). The amendments also address licensure 
requirements, suspension of licenses, an administrative process available to ag-
grieved customers, and annual reports. 
62. Legislative History of H.B. 226 (B.R. 1099), available at http://www.lrc.-
state.ky.us/record/98rs/HB226.htm. 
63. John Hendreu, Loan Firms Give Campaign Donations, Loisville Courier 
JOURNAL,Feb.23,1999. 
64. Correspondence and notes from the author's file. 
65. Susan Fernandez, Check-Cash Compromise Sets Rate at $15 per $100, LEXING-
TON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 1, 1998 at Dl, D6; Robert T. Garrett, Check Cashers Avoid 
Lower Interest Limit, LOUISVILLE COURIER:JOURNAL, Apr. 1, 1998 at 01B. As those ar-
ticles reflect, the final compromise was to permit a fee of $15 per $100 for a two-
week loan and prohibit roll-overs entirely. Chapter 601 does so provide. It also 
contains a reference to an outer limit of sixty days for holding a deferred deposit 
transaction; that provision may be an inadvertent carry-over from an earlier ver-
sion. 
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D. The Kentucky Supreme Court Decision 
Litigation challenging check-based loans occurring before the 
April 1998 legislative changes continued. In one such suit, brought 
by the bankruptcy trustee for several debtors, White v. Check Holders, 
Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky certified to the Kentucky Supreme Court the question of the 
applicability of the original 1992 language of chapter 368 to check-
based loans.
66 
Deciding the certified question on June 17, 1999, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled, "it is clear that the 1992 Act 
did not embrace deferred deposit transactions.,,67 
The court first observed that the plain language of the 1992 
statute permits check cashing for a fee disclosed to the customer; 
there is no language permitting check cashers to advance funds 
and hold checks, thus providing short-term loans.
68 
However, given 
the uncertainty generated by the use of a check to evidence the 
loan, the court turned to several sources for assistance: legislative 
history, administrative construction, case law, and subsequent legis-
lative activity.69 
As to the legislative history of the 1992 statute, the court cited 
the purpose as stated above by Sen. Smith,70 and the fact that the 
bill thereafter passed without amendment. 
As to administrative construction, the court noted that the DFI 
did promulgate regulations regarding various features of check-
based loan transactions, such as maximum fees, numbers of roll-
overs, or use of bad-check prosecutions. Although the Department 
"implicitly construed" the statute to cover check-based loans by li-· 
censing those businesses, that construction did not merit deference 
because it arose outside of rulemaking and adversarial proceed-
• 71 
mgs. 
As for case law, the court cited
72 
the two federal court opinions 
in Hamilton v. York
73 
and Miller v. HLT Check Exchange.
74 
66. 996 S.W.2d 496, 496 (Ky. 1999). 
67. Id. at 500. 
68. !d. at 497. 
69. Id. at 497-98. 
70. Supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
71. White, 996 S.W.2d. at 498. 
72. Id. at 498-99. 
73. 987 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Ky. 1997). Supra notes 3-5,21,27,33-34,38-44,53 
and accompanying text. 
74. 215 B.R. 970 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997). Supra notes 45-52 and accompanying 
text. 
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Finally, the court turned to the 1998 amendments. According 
to the court, "[ t] he 1998 amendments to KRS Chapter 368 demon-
strate that the General Assembly intended, for the first time, to 
bring deferred deposit service businesses under the governance of 
KRS Chapter 368 and the regulatory authority of the DFI.,,75 The 
court gave several reasons for this conclusion. Rep. Jack Coleman, 
one of the bill's sponsors, had so stated.
76 
The amended statute re-
fers to "cashing checks" and "accepting deferred deposit transac-
tions,,77 in the disjunctive, suggesting that these are two types of 
transactions, not the same transaction. 78 If the 1992 statute en-
compassed deferred deposit transactions, there would have been 
no need for the 1998 amendments. 79 The 1998 amendments add 
various provisions specific to deferred deposit transactions, such as 
caps on roll-overs and time limits.
80 
Thus, the court ruled, section 368.100(2), as enacted in 1992, 
did not exempt deferred deposit transactions from usury and loan 
disclosure laws.
81 
E. The Legislative Near Response 
Four months after the Kentucky Supreme Court ruling, its im-
pact was being felt. Plaintiffs' lawyers filed several federal lawsuits, 
alleging fraud and racketeering and seeking class action status, 
against various check-based lenders.82 One lender filed for bank-
ruptcy, claiming $200,000 in debts and $5,000 in assets.83 A Univer-
sity of Kentucky banking and finance professor opined that many 
check-based lenders would soon close shop.84 By mid-February 
2000, there were at least ten federal lawsuits, three had been 
granted class action status, and the glaintiffs had obtained partial 





White, 996 S.W.2d at 499. 
Supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
1998 Ky. Acts 601 § 2 (amending KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368.020 (Michie 
78. White, 996 S.W.2d at 499. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 499-500. 
81. Id. at 500. 
82. John Cheves, Check Cashing Under Attack in Kentucky, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Oct. 23, 1999 at Bl, B2. 
83. Id. at B2. 
84. Id. at Bl, B2. 
85. John Cheves, Bill Altered to Favor Check-Cash Businesses, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Feb. 24, 2000 at AI. 
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plaintiffs stated that the industry could be facing damages of over 
$100 million.86 .. . 
Not surprisingly, the Kentucky General Assembly revisited the 
check cashing and deferred deposit statute in the 2000 session. 
House Bill 73 would have amended the statute in various ways, for 
example, adding definitions of "check cashing" and "postdated 
checks," inserting the term "postdated check" in various places, re-
quiring separate licenses for check cashing and deferred deposit 
businesses, tightening the Department of Financial Institution's 
regulation of the latter, and adjusting the bases for calculating the 
fees for a deferred deposit transaction and the limits on out-
standing transactions, setting bounds on charging of check collec-
tion fees, forbidding electronic debits of customers' accounts, and 
explicitly limiting many provisions of the statute to licensees en-
gaged in deferred deposit transactions.
87 
Most intriguing .was the 
following provision, added by floor amendment in the House:
88 
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
hereby declares that in enacting this Act, it is the intent of 
the General Assembly to do all of the following: 
(1) To recognize that KRS Chapter 368 as created by 1992 
Ky. Acts Chs. 213 and 341 (Senate Bill 311 and House Bill 
747) in 1992 included deferred deposit transactions; 
(2) To recognize further that in amending KRS Chapter 
368 by the enactment of 1998 Ky. Acts Ch. 601 (House Bill 
226) in the 1998 Regular Session, the General Assembly 
contemplated that deferred deposit transactions were 
check cashing transactions preViously governed by the 
1992 creation of KRS Chapter 368 and that it was not for 
the first time bringing deferred deposit service businesses 
under the governance of KRS Chapter 368 and the regu-
latory authority of the Department of Financial Institu-
tions, but rather that authority to engage in deferred de-
posit service business and to have those transactions 
regulated by the Department of Financial Institutions had 
already been covered under the 1992 enactment of Chap-
ter 368; and 
(3) To clarifY this issue of statutory interpretation, and to 
86. [d. 
87. H.B. 73, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000), available at http://www.lrc.-
state.ky.us/record/00rs/HB73/bill.doc. 
88. H.B. 73, available at http://www.lrc.ky.us/record/00rs/HB73/bill.doc 
(adding new section to KY. REv. STAT. § 368.103 (1992». 
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recognize, confirm, and declare that: 
(a) Any check cashing company licensed under KRS 
Chapter 368, prior to the effective date of 1998 Ky. Acts. 
Ch. 601, that accepted and deferred deposit of personal 
checks was authorized to charge a service fee that specifi-
cally was not interest under KRS 368.100(2) and 
(b) Therefore, charging of such a fee was not subject to 
the usury laws and disclosure provisions in KRS Chapter 
360.89 
989 
However, this statement of retroactive legislative intent was de-




It has now been several years since I first heard of "check cash-
ing cases," and I still find myself mulling over three related ques-
tions: What are the lessons to be learned about the role of seman-
tics in business and law? How well did the legal process work, both 
as to resolving disputes and as to making law? And how much does 
the law govern behavior anyway? 
A. About Language 
Over the past several years, I have sought to describe check-
based loans to various peop~e: my family, students, faculty col-
leagues, lawyers, friends, etc. Brief descriptions seldom work. Most 
of the time, I have succeeded only by presenting one step at a time, 
first the initial exchange of a check for cash, then several rounds of 
continuing the transaction. Often I have identified myself as the 
lender and my partner in conversation as the borrower, and I have 
used specific figures (typically a $100 deal).91 
Despite the difficulty of the task, businesses and lawmakers 
have tried to capture what happens in simple names. Of course, 
each such name reflects a certain view. 
I collected advertisements and forms during my year in Ken-
tucky. The company names and product labels are interesting: 
89. [d. 
90. Legislative history of H.B. 73, available at http://www.lrc.ky.us/record/-
00rs/HB73/bill.doc. 
9l. Indeed, my most successful presentation (in my opinion) was a series of 
skits my husband and I performed over several months for my 1998-1999 Contracts 
class. 
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Speedy Cash offering "check advances," Cash 4 Checks calling 
upon customers to "get cash fast," Check Quest offering "cash in a 
flash," E-Z Cash, Check Exchange, Cash in Hand. Advertisements 
explaining the transaction typically stated that the business would 
cash the customer's personal check and hold it up to two weeks be-
fore depositing it. Not surprisingly, the advertisements emphasized 
only certain aspects of the transactions: cash now in exchange for a 
check, that is, the part of the transaction that would benefit and 
hence attract the customer. The typical form used to memorialize 
the transaction provided little additional information, describing 
the customer's financial obligation as payment of a "service fee," 
presumably a more palatable concept than "interest" or "finance 
charge." 
As I worked with various borrowers, I came to appreciate, 
rather slowly, that for some borrowers, the written word mattered 
little. As low literates,92 they operated largely upon what they 
heard. And I inferred from what they said that they conceived of 
the transactions as the "cashing of checks." 
I found it interesting that the industry's name for itself dif-
fered in tone and focus from the terminology used with customers. 
The industry'S trade group name, the Kentucky Deferred Deposit 
Association, is a distinctly un-snazzy label focused not on the start 
of the transaction but rather (curiously) on the feature that differ-
entiates the transactions from traditional check cashing. Further-
more, the label is somewhat imprecise, as what is deferred is not 
the deposit of the check (a bank's customer deposits a paycheck, 
for example, into her account), but rather its presentment.93 
So, the industry used various labels to depict the transactions 
in a favorable light for customers, on the one hand, and their trade 
group as an unremarkable and (presumably) responsible business 
entity, on the other hand.
94 
Ultimately, what came to matter most, 
in the late 1990's, was how the legal system conceived of the trans-
actions. 
As James Boyd White has observed, "[In] the law: we convert 
immediate experience into the subject of thought of a particular 
92. I was certified as an adult literacy tutor during my time in Kentucky, and I 
administered a literacy test to a number of clients, with their consent, of course. 
93. American Bankers Association, Banking Terminology 109, 274 (3d ed. 
1991 ). 
94. One can only imagine how a legislator or regulator would respond to the 
Kentucky Cash-in-a-Flash Association. 
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kind, which has at its center the question of meaning: what this 
event means, and should mean, in the language of the law .... ,,95 
Legal language matters greatly, of course, because legal conse-.~ 
quences flow from labeling a transaction a certain way. 
In the late 1990's, two legal categories existed into which one 
could fit the new check-based loan transaction. One group--the 
Kentucky Deferred Deposit Association, the lenders, their lawyers, 
and the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions-saw the 
tran~actions as fitting into the largely unregulated legal category of 
"check cashing." A second group--consumer advocates, their law-
yers, initially the federal courts, and then the Kentucky Supreme 
Court-saw the transactions as "loans" involving "interest" or "fi-
nance charges," that is, highly regulated transactions. 
How could two such different opinions co-exist? Perhaps self-
interest drove the analysis, at least for the parties to the transaction 
(and perhaps their lawyers). Probably the two groups focused on 
different points in time: the first group on the inception of the 
transaction, the second group on its probable continuation. The 
first group focused on the form of the transaction, the piece of pa-
per we all deem a "check" and the currency we all deem "cash"; the 
second group focused on the substance of the transaction, the fee 
paid for the use of money over time. 
I believe that the first group may also have succumbed to an 
impulse toward cognitive efficiency: the concept of "check cashing" 
existed in the Kentucky statute, it seemed to fit, and so it was ap-
plied. But such efficiency is not always appropriate. As the courts' 
opinions teach, in interpreting legislative language, one must also 
ask what the statute as a whole says and is about, what the legisla-
tors stated about their intentions, and what is good public policy.96 
In understanding behavior that poses issues of legal categorization, 
one must look beyond the surface to discern what is really happen-
ing.97 In sum, the cases are testaments to the importance of sub-
stance over form. 
One reason for resorting to cognitive efficiency may be the dif-
ficulty of developing a better label than the one that currently ex-
ists. The legal texts described above show the linguistic develop-
ment of check-based loans. Judge Hood described the two phases 
95. James Boyd White, Meaning in the Life of the Lawyer, 26 CUMBo L. REv. 763, 
770 (1996). 
96. Supra notes 33-53, 6~1 and accompanying text. 
97. Supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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as "check cashing" and "deferral" transactions-quotation marks 
included.
98 
When the legislature responded to the federal court de-
cisions, it created the concept of "deferred deposit transaction."gg 
The Kentucky Supreme Court, responding to a certified question 
framed in terms of cashing checks and deferring deposits,I00 not 
only wrote about "deferred deposit transactions" but also, simply, 
" h I ,,101 sort-term oans. 
B. About Legal Process 
The legal story told in Part III reveals much about the United 
States legal system, in both its dispute-resolving and its law-making 
roles. It also raises some interesting questions. 
The story reveals various features of legislative law and process: 
the close connection between federal and state legislation, the 
processes of initial enactment and amendment, the reliance of the 
legislature upon administrative agencies, the responsiveness of the 
legislature to judicial action, the importance of participation by in-
terested parties, the significance of legislators' statements of their 
intent, and (as noted above) the legislature's dependence upon 
words to capture concepts. 
The story reveals various features of judicial law and process: 
the interaction between state and federal courts (in both the re-
moval of a state court case to federal court and the certification of a 
question from the federal court to the state supreme court), the 
roles of specialized courts and courts of general jurisdiction, the 
various types of claims out of which a legal issue can arise (a simple 
claim, a responsive adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, a 
class action), the importance of motion practice, the judiciary's 
role in interpreting statutes, and the judiciary's dependence upon 
words. 
The story also reveals various features of administrative law and 
process: the classic roles of rules promulgation and case adjudica-
tion (not fulfilled here), the everyday roles of licensure and inspec-
tion, the agency's role in implementing statutory mandates, and 
the court's deference (or lack thereof) to the agency's expertise. 
Furthermore, the story also shows how varied are the settings 
98. Supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
99. Supra notes 5<k>5 and accompanying text. 
100. White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W. 2d 496, 497 (Ky. 1999). 
101. Id. 
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in which lawyers practice: rural legal services, a small rural firm, a 
large metropolitan firm, the attorney general, county attorneys, the 
bankruptcy trustee's staff. 
One broad question about this story as an example of the legal 
process is: How well has the legal system worked to resolve disputes 
between the check-based lenders and their borrowers? One can 
ponder both the fairness of the outcome and the fairness of the le-
gal proceedings. 
So far as I am aware, there is no case reporting a borrower's 
recovery against a lender based on loans predating the 1998 
amendments. Borrowers can seek a wide range of remedies, in-
cluding return of sums paid, forgiveness of unpaid interest, double 
and triple damages, actual damages, and conceivably punitive dam-
ages.
102 
As noted above, some observers deem the potential liability 
large enough to force some lenders to close. Whether large recov-
eries and business closings are good results is open to debate. Not 
surprisingly, my own view is that check-based lenders operating, be-
fore the 1998 amendments, as though they were unregulated check 
cashers did indeed engage in exploitative practices, and significant 
sanctions are warranted, including damage awards sufficiently large 
not only to compensate borrowers but also deter wrongdoing. 103 
As for the fairness of the legal proceedings, I find the story 
told above both heartening and disheartening. It is heartening 
that both sides found able advocates, that the mechanisms for re-
solving the significant legal issue existed, and that the courts re-
sponded fairly promptly to decide that issue. 104 It is disheartening 
that a fast and simple process for resolving the many individual 
cases, now factual disputes arising under fixed legal rules, is not 
readily available. One hopes that the lawyers in the class action liti-
gation will devise such a system, so as to avoid protracted legal pro-
ceedings that deny borrowers much needed compensation and 
suspend lenders in financial limbo. 
A second broad question about the story as an example of the 
102. See Verified Complaint, Hamilton v. York, C.A. No. 97-CI-1300 (Pike Cir. 
Ct. Ky. Aug. 1997). 
103. I am less condemning of businesses operating under the strictures and 
spirit of the 1998 amendments; indeed, they may provide a useful means of provid-
ing cash for crisis situations to people with limited options. 
104. My perception of the relative speed of the process does not necessarily 
reflect the views of my clients however. It was hard to explain, for example, why 
the Defendant in the Hamilton case did not tender a real response until two 
months after the Complaint was served. 
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legal process is: How well has the legal system worked to make law? 
One can debate what the law should permit and prohibit. Not sur-
prisingly, my own view is that significant regulation of check-based 
loans is warranted to assure that the cost, amount, and duration are 
limited and that the borrower is thoroughly informed.
105 
I find the story a fascinating example of how a rule of law is ar-
ticulated, over time and through various mechanisms. The media 
covered this story frequently, providing some insight into how the 
law was understood. In an article in the Lexington Herald-Leader in 
October 1999, the author recounted past events, ending with the 
ruling of the Kentucky Supreme Court, and stated, "[C]heck cash-
ers suddenly were vulnerable for their past·conduct.,,106 
To my mind, the lenders had always been vulnerable; the law 
had always been that check-based loans were regulated as small 
consumer loans, subject to usury, disclosure, and anti-fraud laws. 
When the federal judges ruled in Hamilton and Miller, they con-
firmed, with considerable authority, what was already so. The 1998 
amendments changed the rules as to future transactions, but they 
did not, of course, alter what had been the law before that point; 
indeed the amendments, in explicitly addressing check-based 
loans, implicitly confirmed that check-based loans were not previ-
ously covered by the check cashing statute. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court ruling in June 1999 further confirmed, as authoritatively as 
possible, what the law was before 1998. 
Nonetheless, in others' minds, the rule of law was not so 
clearly articulated. Why? In part, as discussed above, semantic dif-
ficulties gave rise to some confusion. In part, the confusion 
stemmed (I think, based on my conversations with lenders and law-
yers for lenders) from lack of clarity as to who or what articulates 
the law. The industry apparently relied on the murky position of 
the Department of Financial Institutions. Some discounted the 
federal court rulings as insignificant, pending a decision by the 
Kentucky Supreme Court. Some deemed the 1998 amendments 
irrelevant to the issue of previous law. The media compounded the 
105. One of the harder moments for me during my time in Kentucky came as I 
interviewed an individual who engaged in check-based loan transactions occurring 
after the effective date of the 1998 amendments. Mindful of the critical role that 
threats of prosecution played in earlier transactions and aware that the new law 
requires written notice that lenders cannot prosecute clients for bad checks, I 
asked the client whether she had been given written notice. Then I learned that 
she did not know, whether she had or not, due to her low literacy. 
106. Cheves, supra note 81, at B1, B2. 
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confusion by routinely stating that the industry was not regulated 
until the 1998 amendments; presumably the media missed the 
point that a transaction may be regulated not only by a specific 
statute, but also by broad statutes and general legal principles. 
One would reasonably assume that the Kentucky Supreme 
Court decision would settle the matter, especially given its thor-
ough discussion of the original statute and its amendment, the ad-
ministrative position, and the federal cases.. The proposed 2000 
amendment discussing legislative intent, quoted above, appears as a 
rather startling attempt to undermine whatever authoritativeness 
the legal system finally obtained as to the rule of law for pre-1998 
check-based loans. Happily, it was not enacted. 
C. About Law And Behaviar 
During my time in Kentucky, I was acutely aware of being in-
volved in twin processes, dispute resolving and law making. I came 
to realize that they are fraternal, not identical, twins. That is, rules 
of law do not alone govern the resolution of disputes, at least in the 
informal process of negotiation. I expected that other factors, such 
as attitudes towards risk, tolerance of conflict, and financial circum-
stances, would matter; indeed these factors did, often times inclin-
ing borrowers in pre-1998 transactions to accept less than their full 
legal entitlement. 
What I had not anticipated, at least not much, was that both 
sides to these transactions would rely so substantially on non-legal 
norms. My borrower clients, when told of the law affording them 
various remedies, reacted various ways. Some, fueled mostly by le-
gal norms, did indeed perceive that they had been exploited and 
wanted to secure the full range of legal remedies available to them. 
But others, influenced mostly by the exigencies 'of daily life, simply 
wanted to walk away with no further obligation to-and an assur-
ance of no further pressure from-the lenders. Others, looking 
beyond the law to personal standards of conduct, felt obligated to 
make reasonable efforts to pay back the cash advanced, even if the 
fees already paid equaled the cash advanced. Even when told of 
the law forbidding their conduct, lenders would routinely defend it 
on two grounds: that the borrower had made a choice and a con-
tract, unencumbered by whatever the law might say. 
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